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The concept of the minimal self refers to the consciousness of oneself as an immediate
subject of experience. According to recent studies, disturbances of the minimal self may be
a core feature of schizophrenia. They are emphasized in classical psychiatry literature and in
phenomenological work. Impaired minimal self-experience may be defined as a distortion
of one’s first-person experiential perspective as, for example, an “altered presence” during
which the sense of the experienced self (“mineness”) is subtly affected, or “altered
sense of demarcation,” i.e., a difficulty discriminating the self from the non-self. Little
is known, however, about the cognitive basis of these disturbances. In fact, recent work
indicates that disorders of the self are not correlated with cognitive impairments commonly
found in schizophrenia such as working-memory and attention disorders. In addition, a
major difficulty with exploring the minimal self experimentally lies in its definition as
being non-self-reflexive, and distinct from the verbalized, explicit awareness of an “I.”
In this paper, we shall discuss the possibility that disturbances of the minimal self
observed in patients with schizophrenia are related to alterations in time processing.
We shall review the literature on schizophrenia and time processing that lends support
to this possibility. In particular we shall discuss the involvement of temporal integration
windows on different time scales (implicit time processing) as well as duration perception
disturbances (explicit time processing) in disorders of the minimal self. We argue that
a better understanding of the relationship between time and the minimal self as well
of issues of embodiment require research that looks more specifically at implicit time
processing. Some methodological issues will be discussed.
Keywords: schizophrenia, time perception, self-concept, consciousness, psychology of the self, psychopathology,
experimental psychology
DISTURBANCES OF MINIMAL SELF AND SCHIZOPHRENIA
There is a consensus that the self is disordered in patients with
schizophrenia (for review, Lysaker and Lysaker, 2010; Mishara
et al., 2014). Several studies suggest these disorders include a dis-
turbance of the most elementary component of self, i.e., minimal
self-disorders (SDs; Gallese and Ferri, 2013; Nelson et al., 2013;
Hur et al., 2014). However, characterizing these disorders and
understanding the mechanisms involved remain a challenge. In
the present work, we bring together ideas and concepts from two
different domains, phenomenology and experimental psychology.
Combining these two fields is not straightforward, but in the
present case such an integrative approach helps us to see the recent
phenomenology and timing literature in a new perspective and to
discuss the possible impact of timing characteristics on the self.
Previously (e.g., Mishara, 2007) it has been proposed there may
be a relationship between timing disorders and SDs, but recent
data in this field may help to shed new light on this possible link.
THE MINIMAL SELF
From the point of view of phenomenology, the minimal self is
the most basic level of the self. Gallagher (2000, p. 15) defines
the minimal self as “a consciousness of oneself as an immediate
subject of experience” and as “the pre-reflexive point of origin for
action, experience and thought.”
Thus, the minimal self refers to the tacit and pre-reflexive
selfhood (Nelson et al., 2013). As explained by Stanghellini (2009)
“I experience myself as the perspectival origin of my experiences
(i.e., perceptions or emotions), actions and thoughts.” Conse-
quently, the minimal self can be seen separately from more
elaborate aspects of the self (Gallagher, 2000; Parnas and Handest,
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2003; Nelson et al., 2013) such as the reflexive self (e.g., the explicit
awareness of an “I”) and the narrative self (e.g., experiencing
the self as having special characteristics, like a personality, and a
personal history that we tell about ourselves; Haug et al., 2012).
It is especially important to distinguish between the reflexive
and pre-reflexive self. We base our approach on earlier phe-
nomenological work (de Warren, 2009). Brentano and Husserl
in particular distinguish between the object of a perception and
the conscious perception itself. de Warren provides the following
example as inspired by Brentano and Husserl: “when looking at
this tree in my backyard, my consciousness is directed toward the
tree and not toward my own act of perception. I am, however,
aware of myself as perceiving this tree, yet this self-awareness (or
self-consciousness) is not itself thematic”, e.g. not reflexive. (de
Warren, 2009, p. 19). According to Brentano, when an object
of the outer world is present in our mind we simultaneously
apprehend the mental phenomenon itself, but this does not lead
to explicit reflection: “every act of consciousness is also implicitly
conscious of itself, but only to the extent that it is a consciousness
of something other than itself ” (de Warren, 2009, p. 77). Put
another way, when we say “I perceive a tree,” we are usually
focusing on the object of perception, i.e., the tree. The “I,”
although not unconscious, is only present implicitly. This self-
awareness does not compete with the representation of the tree
as long as it remains implicit. It is part of the act of consciousness.
As we have already seen above, this pre-reflexive “mineness” of
conscious experience is a central characteristic of the minimal self.
In contrast, a reflexive act of consciousness is described as
reflexive when intentionality is directed toward the act of con-
sciousness itself. As regards de Warren’s example of the tree, “I
can, through a further act of reflexion, make my perceptual act
into theme, or object, of my consciousness, in which case I am
no longer immersed in my directedness towards the tree, but
redirected toward myself as perceiving the tree” (de Warren, 2009,
p. 20). In this case, self-consciousness becomes reflexive, i.e., an
explicit theme through an act of self-observation, which is distinct
from a pre-reflexive perspective. Contrary to the minimal self,
the explicit representation of self competes with other represen-
tations. We either perceive the tree or think about ourselves.
Although these distinctions have important limitations (see
Zahavi, 1999), they will be sufficient for the minimal SD issues
addressed in this paper. In particular, philosophers have strug-
gled with the Brentano’s proposal according to which the act of
consciousness may entail different objects simultaneously: “the
presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation
of the sound (i.e., hearing) form a single mental phenomenon; it
is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one
of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phe-
nomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations”
(de Warren, 2009, pp. 78–79). Here, we interpret this proposal
like de Warren by considering self-awareness to be present during
an act of perception without being the focus of attention, i.e., in
an implicit way. It is clear that the concept of self as we discuss
it here is not the purest and most abstract form, which would be
independent of time and would precede our interaction with the
outer world (see Mishara, 2007; Mishara et al., 2014 for a critic of
the latter approach), but rather an embodied self. It is during our
experience of the world that we implicitly experience ourselves.
Consequently, if our experience of the world is distorted, then our
implicit experience of ourselves is bound to be disturbed as well.
The following clinical examples help further define what we mean
by minimal SDs.
DISTURBANCES OF THE MINIMAL SELF AS A TRAIT MARKER OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Evidence from empirical research and clinical analysis suggest
that a disturbance of the minimal self (minimal-SDs) can be
considered a core feature of schizophrenia. Minimal SDs have
been described in prodromal, early, and more chronic stages of
schizophrenia (Møller and Husby, 2000; Parnas et al., 2003, 2005;
Raballo et al., 2011). They are described through a broad range
of experiences, as listed in detail in the Exploration of Anomalous
Self Experience (EASE), a phenomenology-oriented instrument
centered on the exploration of minimal SDs (Parnas et al., 2005).
This EASE sets out to list recurrent experiences of a distortion of
one’s first-person experiential perspective. The following exam-
ples (translated from French by Brice Martin) illustrate patients’
responses (Parnas et al., 2005):
Alterations of the ‘stream of consciousness’ can be understood
as there being a gap between one’s own thoughts and the self,
leading to the loss of “mineness” of mental experience. One
example of this is “thought interference,” like, for example, in a
patient’s own words “when I’m thinking, you see, sometimes, it’s a
bit like. . .there are some words. . .some words or ideas which come
into my mind. . .in a disconnected fashion. . ., which have nothing to
do with what I’m thinking,. . .which can be banal. . ., which interfere
with what I’m thinking. . ..”
The Alteration of the Presence corresponds to a broad range of
phenomena that can be defined as a lack of immersion in the
world. An example of the alteration of the presence is “a loss
of natural evidence” (Blankenburg, 1971). It denotes a “lack of
automatic, pre-reflective grasp of the meaning of everyday events,
situations, people and objects” (Parnas et al., 2005) as, in the
words of a patient, “you see, for me, it’s a bit like. . .as if nothing
was obvious for me. . .The world is something. . .very complicated
for me. . .It’s tiring because I’m always thinking. . . I’m constantly
wondering how people are going so easily through life, through
things. . . Everything is a question for me. . .you see, I think about
everything, and I can’t help it. . .my mother always tells me I spend
too much time wondering about too many things. . .for example. . .
yesterday. . . I sat down in front of a wall, and, for one or two
hours, asked myself how it had been built? Sometimes, I wonder why
“paper” is called “paper”?”.
‘Corporeal experiences’ or ‘disembodiment’ denotes the feeling of
being detached from oneself and one’s actions, as if in a third-
person perspective or without any perspective at all. One example
of this is the “spatialization of bodily experiences” where the body
is experienced as an object, with a weakened self experience, as in
the following narrative: “mmh. . .you see, it’s like my body. . .it’s like
I can perceive inside my body, like things being a bit disconnected
from my body. . .I frequently feel my heart beating. . .or the blow
flowing in my veins. . .I can feel it, it’s as if I can see it. . .or my
muscles when I’m moving my arm. . .it’s a bit like my body was
constantly. . .was constantly present you see. . .as a thing in front of
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me. . .as if I wasn’t really inside my body. . ..” A loss of self thereafter
means a disconnectedness that can be described as detachment
from one’s physical body (de Haan and Fuchs, 2010).
The altered sense of demarcation can be understood as a dif-
ficulty discriminating self from not self, and, consequently, as
a “loss or permeability of self-world boundary” (Parnas et al.,
2005). One illustration of this can be seen in the following
patient’s explanation: “you see, I’m like a house with a door that is
constantly open. . .I’m living the fact that. . .as if people could come
in. . .as if people could know what I’m thinking. . . As if. . . I’ve no
barrier. . .as if there was no barrier between me and others. . .”
All the above disturbances can be described as a loss of the
center of gravity of experience (the “zero point”).
The consideration of minimal SDs in psychiatry may have con-
siderable applications, especially in differential diagnosis, inas-
much as SDs differ in schizophrenia and in bipolar disorders
(Parnas et al., 2003). The evaluation of these minimal SDs may
also be relevant for the outcomes of schizophrenia, such as suici-
dal behaviors, which appear to be correlated with the intensity
of minimal SDs (Skodlar and Parnas, 2010). To date, however,
detection of these disturbances relies on the verbal reports given
by the patients. Such reports should be interpreted with caution,
especially since the minimal self is related to non-verbal aspects
of consciousness. The difficulty is to find a way of objectifying
the minimal self with a non-verbal approach, while ensuring that
this approach is relevant to the minimal self (Mishara, 2007;
Mishara et al., 2014). Below, we discuss the possible role of time
processing, which may be one of the key mechanisms underlying
certain properties of the minimal self (Kiverstein, 2009). We sum
up existing arguments in favor of elementary timing disorders in
patients with schizophrenia and argue that such perceptual timing
disorders should impact the sense of self, inasmuch as temporal
aspects are involved in any states of feeling, whether regarding the
self or the outer world.
COGNITIVE BASIS OF MINIMAL SELF DISTURBANCES IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA: TOWARD THE QUESTION OF TIME?
Little is known about the basic processes and cognitive correlates
of minimal SDs. The question we ask here is whether known
cognitive disturbances in patients with schizophrenia lead to
minimal SDs. We present a synthetic review of works targeting
this issue.
CLASSICAL NEUROCOGNITIVE DISTURBANCES IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
AND SDs
Neurocognitive impairments appear to be a core feature of
schizophrenia, having a major impact on everyday functioning
(Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000). The most common disturbances
concern attention, memory, and executive processing (Heinrichs
and Zakzanis, 1998).
These disturbances are frequently considered to be an impor-
tant source of difficulties for patients in everyday life. For exam-
ple, they are commonly considered to be the most important fac-
tor underlying the functional disabilities observed in schizophre-
nia, impinging upon patients’ daily lives (Velligan et al., 2006) and
employment. They constitute the target for cognitive remediation,
a promising therapeutic tool (Demily and Franck, 2008).
Despite their frequency and importance in terms of disabili-
ties, the link between these cognitive disturbances and minimal
SDs in schizophrenia is unclear. Very few studies have attempted
to explore these relationships. Haug (Haug et al., 2012) explored
cognitive functioning (psychomotor speed, working memory,
executive and memory functioning) and correlated cognitive
impairments in schizophrenia with minimal SDs as assessed using
EASE. However, they found few correlations between cognitive
functioning and SDs.
We argue that cognitive functions as explored in the usual neu-
ropsychological batteries may not be the most suitable approach.
Below, we present the results of studies that are potentially closer
to the question of the minimal self. There have been many studies
that have explored the concept of agency. Agency is the feeling
of being the agent of an action and has mostly been explored by
explicitly asking subjects whether or not they are at the origin of a
given action. As such, agency is reflexive rather than pre-reflexive.
However, the mechanisms hypothetized as being involved in this
emerging feeling are largely unconscious and pre-reflexive and
could affect the minimal self. Moreover, some observations raise
the question of timing. For these reasons, we start by presenting a
summary of the studies exploring agency.
INTERNAL MODELS AND MINIMAL SDs
The last few decades have seen the emergence of a set of cognitive
hypotheses targeting some of the clinical features of schizophrenia
such as delusions of alien control (first rank symptoms according
to Schneider, 1995) and the delusional feeling of being controlled
or influenced by other agents, both common manifestations in
schizophrenia. Although these manifestations appear to reflect
disorders of the reflexive self, they may still be connected with
minimal SDs. Indeed, there are a number of arguments that have
led us to develop the question of agency despite its being self-
reflexive. In fact, impaired agency is observed mainly in acute
phases of schizophrenia and only affects patients permanently in
exceptional cases, although some disorders might persist in the
interval between acute phases. It has been proposed that impaired
agency emerges as a result of a combination of impairments,
some of which would not be explicit and might be related to
minimal SDs (Frith, 2005). Such impairments would lead to a
loss of control, a frequent feeling which can arise, for example,
when an action has not been performed in an optimal fashion
(Pacherie, 2008). While not resulting in a loss of agency, it may
weaken our implicit sense of being at the origin of our action.
Insofar as it is not reflexive, such a loss of control might thus be
connected with minimal SDs. It is additional impairments, such
as abnormal interpretations of causal relationships, which would
lead to explicit agency impairments and delusions of control.
To make our arguments more concrete, we detail below the
mechanisms that have been hypothesized as being involved in the
loss of control. This in turn raises time issues.
Empirical work has been conducted in connection with “for-
ward models,” including mechanisms not related to conscious
awareness. According to this approach, the sense of agency among
healthy subjects is based on mechanisms that allow us to prepare
an action and to translate intentions into actions (Frith, 2005).
Based on Wolpert’s (1997) model, the intention is translated into
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a motor program by means of an “inverse” model which allows
the motor system to adjust the motor program to the intention
even before the movement is initiated. Desmurget and Sirigu
(2012) proposed that these first steps are associated with both
a “wanting to move” and an “urge to move.” Such feelings may
be conscious, but they are not self-reflexive. Like the example
given above of perceiving a tree, when we want to move, we
focus on the action, and not on the “I” performing the action.
It is worth emphasizing that we do not discuss the issue of will
in this paper. “Wanting” to move suggests there is a conscious
decision prior to moving. However, when we take a conscious
decision, we usually focus our attention on the decision itself, not
on the “I” taking the decision. Once again, the “I” will only be
present implicitly. Yet, insofar as this “I” is defined in relation to
the action, impairments in the ability to convert the first steps of
action planning into real action might impair the implicit sense of
“I,” i.e., the minimal self. In fact, some studies have suggested that
some aspects of planning are impaired in schizophrenia in the case
of simple action sequences (Zalla et al., 2006; Delevoye-Turrell
et al., 2007). For example, it has been shown that patients with
schizophrenia have planning difficulties when tapping a surface
with their finger. Tapping involves lowering the finger and then
lifting it. It has been shown that healthy subjects can plan to lift
their finger before the action onset and do not need to wait for
sensory feedback. Patients, however, appear to wait for sensory
information regarding surface contact before lifting their finger.
Similarly, they have repeatedly been shown to be impaired every
time separate parts of a movement should succeed each other
smoothly (Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2003, 2007). Inasmuch as such
impairments may weaken the ability to convert an intention into
a controlled action efficiently, it might impact the implicit and
pre-reflexive feeling of control associated with motor actions. It is
noteworthy that all these impairments are observed when several
components of an action must follow one another, and that they
are reflected in abnormally long intervals between separate motor
elements making up the action.
These findings emphasize the timing component of action in
patients (Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2012; Turgeon et al., 2012). This
is also the case with another component of motor action, the
“efference copy.” Once a motor program is adjusted, it generates
an “efference copy,” which is used to predict the sensory outcome
of the action by means of the forward model (von Holst and
Mittelstaedt, 1950). The action is then adjusted by comparing the
expected outcome with the actual sensory feedback occurring as
a result of the action. When the expected and actual outcome of
the action match, the correspondence of these signals reinforces
the sense of having initiated the action (Frith, 2005). It has
been proposed that the efference copy is disturbed in patients
with schizophrenia (Kelso, 1977; Franck et al., 2001; Jeannerod,
2009; Voss et al., 2010; Synofzik et al., 2013). As a result of
this disturbance, patients would not benefit from the match
between the predicted and actual outcome of the action. Again,
the consequence would be a weakening of the sense of having
initiated the action. As already emphasized, this does not lead
directly to the delusional belief of being controlled by an exter-
nal agent, which, in order to develop, would require additional
impairments (Frith, 2005). Inasmuch as the weakening of the
sense of initiating the action occurs implicitly, without the subject
being able to report it explicitly, it might be related to minimal
SDs. Interestingly, the mechanisms associated with producing
an efference copy might also involve a timing component. The
efference copy involves a temporal dimension, inasmuch as it
is used to predict sensory feedback, and hence the timing of
such feedback. The temporal dimension of the forward model
had been underlined by Wolpert himself, and more recently
by a series of other authors (e.g., Waters and Jablensky, 2009).
Interestingly, the temporal distortion of the sensory feedback
appears to impact all patients with schizophrenia and to affect
their sense of agency independently of the association with delu-
sions of control (Franck et al., 2001). Time processing disorders
might be more stable markers than those ultimately resulting
in delusions of control. In other words, timing disorders might
be trait markers that persist in chronic phases of the pathol-
ogy. This is consistent with the idea that such disorders weaken
patients, possibly by inducing minimal SDs, but produce agency
disturbances only secondarily. Patients may interpret their basic
disorders in different ways, which explains why agency distur-
bances can take many different forms, with patients attributing
their action to various agents (e.g., God, extra-terrestrial beings,
television). However, these different interpretations would stem
from a similar basic impairment. In that sense, the agency studies
shed light on minimal SDs in schizophrenia (see Gallese and Ferri,
2013).
Yet, this approach may not provide the full explanation for
minimal SDs in schizophrenia. First of all, forward models
account for only part of minimal SDs because they target mainly
motor action. Consequently, they give preference to exploring
the sense of agency based on body perception and do not easily
address other clinical manifestations, such as the alteration of
presence.
Moreover, some models of the minimal self (Gallagher, 2000)
distinguish between two components: the sense of “agency”
involving forward models, and the sense of “ownership.” The
sense of ownership may be closer to the minimal self than the
sense of agency. We feel our body as our own body even when we
do not move, or when our action is involuntary rather than delib-
erate. This feeling corresponds to the sense of “ownership.” As in
previous examples, it is not necessarily self-reflexive. We can say
“my body” without reflecting on the “my.” The current assump-
tion in the literature is that only one component of the minimal
self, the sense of agency, is disturbed in schizophrenia. However,
Parnas suggests both aspects of minimal self are concomitantly
impaired in schizophrenia. Indeed, the EASE assessment suggests
minimal-SDs include both, impairments of ownership and agency
(Parnas et al., 2005). However, it is difficult to disentangle own-
ership and agency disorders, and to the best of our knowledge
the implicit sense of ownership has not been extensively explored
in patients (but see de Haan and Fuchs, 2010), such that the
phenomenological frontiers between these two components of
the minimal self need to be more accurately defined. Lastly, it is
still difficult to distinguish between the reflexive and pre-reflexive
parts of agency, and more work is required in order to understand
which aspects of motor impairments relate to minimal SD in
schizophrenia and to what extent.
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TIME AND MINIMAL SELF IN SCHIZOPHRENIA: WHAT
EVIDENCE IN THE LITERATURE?
After this short review of the motor impairments possibly asso-
ciated with minimal SDs in schizophrenia, we focus more specif-
ically on exploring the potential implications of time deficits in
schizophrenia in minimal SDs.
We shall present two series of arguments to justify time
processing as a relevant issue to explore and with a view to
understanding minimal SDs in this pathology. Mind structuring
disorders, namely arguments deriving from psychopathology and
experimental psychology studies in schizophrenia are presented
below.
EVIDENCE STEMMING FROM CLINICAL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL, AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES
From a psychopathology perspective, the phenomenological
approach proposes a “useful conceptual framework within which
the explanation of pathological experiences could be ventured”
(Wiggins et al., 2003), to include the role of time in the gen-
esis of minimal SDs. In what follows we try to summarize the
hypotheses put forward with the help of this particular conceptual
framework. It should be emphasized that these hypotheses rely
not on experimental work but on the understanding of time issues
derived from phenomenology and on clinical observations.
A first step has to do with the nature of time processing
itself. In phenomenology, time is not necessarily investigated and
understood as a content of consciousness. Rather, it is a key
component structuring the form of consciousness. Thus, time
appears to be a very basic, “ontological” component of reality
(Wiggins et al., 2003).
At the lowest layers of world-constituting processes, philoso-
pher Husserl (1991) locates the question of time and, more
precisely, what he calls “the intimate consciousness of time”
(inneres Zeitbewusstsein). He describes a tripartite structure of
time consciousness, that is seen as an integration of the past, the
present, and the future. He gives the example of music. When
we listen to a tune, we are conscious of the present note but
still have the previous note in mind (“retention”) and usually
anticipate the note to come (“protention”; Gallagher and Zahavi,
2014). As Fuchs (2007) points out, “these synthetic functions,
operating at the most basic layer of consciousness in an implicit,
tacit or automatic way, are capable of integrating the sequence of
single moments into an intentional arc,” allowing the subject to
connect tightly with the world and, thus, structuring conscious-
ness. It should be emphasized that the term “intentional” does
not mean the integration of past, present, and future moments is
deliberate and reflexive. On the contrary, it is passive. According
to phenomenologists, it is a basic mechanism whereby we can
consciously experience the world as a whole and as continuous
in time. Moreover, such mechanisms would shape all our expe-
riences and affect our sense of self (Fuchs, 2007). The ability
passively to integrate past, present, and future moments would
allow us to think in meaningful units. In a similar way to what has
been described in the domain of motor control, protention would
allow us to anticipate the next thought and words when we speak.
This implicit or automatic temporal synthesis (or, in Husser-
lian terms, the “passive” temporal synthesis) contributes to the
stability of the perception of the world. Husserl calls this “doxa,”
e.g., the certainty that the world will be invariant, allowing the
subject to recognize him- or herself in the world. This is one
of the most basic processes guaranteeing that the world can be
“taken-for-granted” (Wiggins et al., 2003). “As a consequence,
the actions of normal people can presuppose a pre-given world,
a spatial, temporal, causal, and social order that their mental
lives consistently constitute” in an automatic way (Wiggins et al.,
2003).
A considerable number of psychopathological works describe
a breakdown of this intentional arc in schizophrenia, which could
lead to the first incidents of schizophrenic experiences or, put
differently, to minimal SDs (Minkowski, 1933/2005; Binswanger,
1965; Tatossian, 2002) or a “weakened ego” (Wiggins et al., 2003).
“If these syntheses should cease to occur in my mental life, the
ongoing existence of the world and its objects would cease for
me” (Wiggins et al., 2003), and the world can no longer be
“taken for granted” (Wiggins et al., 2003). Consequently, because
the lowest strata of mental life are impaired, the person feels
threatened with a kind of selflessness and worldlessness and
experiences “ontological anxiety.” The “selflessness” experienced
here is not reflexive. The presence of “selflessness” is hypothe-
sized by phenomenologists who base their argument on how the
experience of the world is supposed to lead to the minimal self.
Phenomenological inquiry also relies on clinical observations. In
particular clinical observations can be reinterpreted as conscious
compensation for minimal SDs. Because patients’ experience of
the world is distorted, they have to compensate for it. The world
has to be actively reconstructed (the person must engage in
“rational reconstruction”). A wide range of apparent symptoms
can be understood as being a consequence of this fundamental
disturbance of minimal SDs, such as hyperreflexivity or the loss
of natural evidence. Hence, various aspects of minimal self could
be understood or may manifest themselves as an attempt by
the patient “to actively busy him- or herself with re-laying the
ontological foundations of reality” (Wiggins et al., 2003). This
is understandable insofar as there is a balance between the pre-
reflexive and reflexive self. If the pre-reflexive self is weakened,
patients would offset this weakness by giving explicitly thought
to questions we usually ignore (Nelson et al., 2009). Although
an interesting idea, it has often been argued, and rightly so, that
it is difficult to demonstrate (Mishara, 2007). However, there is
also more direct evidence of the distorted world experience of
patients, who appear to stray from a lived and dynamic time. A
thorough examination of the literature suggests direct experiences
of an explicit feeling of time disruption might be more frequent
than suggested by clinical experience (Hartocollis, 1983). For
example, patients describe feeling that time is standing still. One
of Minkowski’s patients gave the following explanation: “I’m
looking for the immobility and I have a tendency to immobilize all
the things around me” (Minkowski, 1927/2002). Another patient
reported: “Things go too quick for my mind. [. . .] It’s as if
you were seeing one picture one minute and another picture
the next” (Chapman, 1966). Similarly, in the words of another
patient, “What is the future? One cannot reach it. [. . .] Time
stands still [. . .]. This is boring, stretched time without an end”
(Fischer, 1929). In the context of our discussion, the following
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statement by a schizophrenic patient of Bin Kimura quoted in
Fuchs (2013) is the following: “Time is also running strangely. It
falls apart and no longer progresses. There arise only innumerable
separate now, now, now . . . quite crazy and without rules or
order. It is the same with myself. From moment to moment,
various “selves” arise and disappear entirely at random. There
is no connection between my present ego and the one before.”
As we shall show below, schizophrenia patients’ performance in
a specific psychophysical task shows behavior interpretable as a
disturbance in the continuity of time, as if they were “stuck” in
time and could not progress temporally.
This short excursion into the phenomenological approach sug-
gests time is a key component of experience and, more than a con-
tent of consciousness, a dynamic component of consciousness.
However, as emphasized above, the evidence is based mainly on
conscious introspection and verbal reports, and the conclusions
are thus necessarily limited. As we have seen, phenomenological
theorization interprets verbal complaints to explain non-verbal,
pre-reflexive mechanisms. This could be considered a major flaw
in the approach. In the following, we develop the contribution of
experimental psychology as regards more hidden aspects of time
processing which might usefully complement the phenomenolog-
ical analyses and patients’ reports.
EVIDENCE FROM COGNITIVE STUDIES TARGETING THE
QUESTION OF TIME
Research into time perception often relies on explicit judgments,
meaning that subjects are explicitly asked to make a judgment
about a temporal property of external stimuli, such as their
duration, order or simultaneity. However, as we have seen above,
timing may also intervene incidentally and may be involved in the
structuring of consciousness. Indeed, a distinction currently made
when exploring time in cognitive science is between “explicit”
and “implicit” timing, resting on different neural networks (Coull
and Nobre, 2008). As we have seen, explicit processing concerns
any mental activity wherever subjects make a deliberate judg-
ment, e.g., about temporal simultaneity or duration. Conversely,
implicit processing occurs without a specific instruction and can
be either conscious or not (Coull and Nobre, 2008). The implicit
processing of time may be especially relevant for minimal self but
cannot be explored without considering explicit aspects.
Paradigms based on explicit timing have been used to assess
different aspects of temporal processes in schizophrenia. The most
typical are “simultaneity judgment” (e.g., assessing the simultane-
ity vs asynchrony of two stimuli), “temporal order judgment”
(e.g., the capacity to order events) and “duration estimation” (e.g.,
the ability to determine the duration of a time interval; Pöppel,
1997; Wittmann, 1999; van Wassenhove, 2009; Grondin, 2010).
Many studies have been conducted to investigate duration
judgment in patients with schizophrenia (Wahl and Sieg, 1980;
Tysk, 1983, 1984; Tracy et al., 1998; Volz et al., 2001; Elvevåg et
al., 2003; Davalos et al., 2005; Penney et al., 2005; Carroll et al.,
2008; Lee et al., 2009; Waters and Jablensky, 2009) or simultaneity
judgment (Schwartz et al., 1984; Foucher et al., 2007; Giersch
et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2013). The general
conclusion of these studies is that patients with schizophrenia find
it more difficult than controls to estimate duration (e.g., a greater
variability of the performances) and require bigger differences
before being able to distinguish the duration of two stimuli. They
also require longer inter-stimulus intervals to be able to make
temporal order judgments.
However, the significance of these results seems limited, for
several reasons. First, there were only a few correlations with clin-
ical dimensions. Moreover, confounding factors such as attention
(Brown and Boltz, 2002), memory processing (Zakay and Block,
2004), and emotional characteristics of the stimuli (Droit-Volet et
al., 2004; Grommet et al., 2011) may explain the greater variability
in performance, especially for duration judgment. Last but not
least, the fact that these evaluations rely on explicit judgments
implies they explore the content of time and not the temporal
structure imposed on consciousness by time processing.
Another way to explore time processing in schizophrenia is to
assess “implicit timing.” According to Coull and Nobre (2008)
“implicit timing is engaged, even without a specific instruc-
tion to time, whenever sensorimotor information is temporally
structured.” It appears that this definition of time is similar to
the phenomenological description of human time inasmuch as
time is seen as an implicit aspect of processing which does not
necessarily lead to a content of consciousness but, rather, shapes
the conscious experience. Here, we focus on implicit aspects of
timing because they might underlie the involvement of timing in
minimal self. We first review the evidence that implicit aspects of
timing are impaired in schizophrenia and then discuss how this
might impact the minimal self.
Few studies have explored implicit timing in schizophrenia,
particularly in perception. Giersch et al. (2009) used a potentially
useful priming paradigm, and Lalanne et al. (2012a,b) used the
Simon effect to track temporal processes (Figure 1); Martin
et al. (2013) assessed the temporal constraints of multi-sensory
integration in schizophrenia; Posada and Franck (2002) explored
the automation of rules and Exner et al. (2006) motor sequence
learning.
One example of these studies is the one by Lalanne et al.
(2012a,b) using the “Simon effect.” In it, subjects have to decide
whether two squares are displayed on a screen simultaneously or
asynchronously. They respond by hitting a left or right response
key (Figure 1). Results revealed an enlarged time window
with patients, irrespective of the squares’ position (intra- vs
interhemispheric presentation), and independently of a non-
specific difficulty with processing the information (Giersch et al.,
2009). The implicit processing of asynchrony was explored by
means of the Simon effect, which refers to the finding that manual
responses are biased (lower reaction times and higher accuracy)
to the side of the stimulus independently of the task at hand. Basi-
cally, the idea is that when stimuli are presented simultaneously
on both sides of the screen, no Simon effect can occur, because
information on both sides is perfectly symmetrical. However,
when stimuli are asynchronous, there is an asymmetry again
between the left and right side, due to the temporal delay. This
allowed the authors to measure a Simon effect related to this tem-
poral asynchrony. The results showed that healthy subjects were
systematically biased to press the button on the side of the second
stimulus (Lalanne et al., 2012a,b), and additional studies sug-
gested they are able to follow stimuli in time at a non-conscious
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the Simon effect. For this task, two squares are
filled in successively, with an SOA varying between 0 and 92 ms, and
subjects are instructed to decide whether the two stimuli are displayed
simultaneously or asynchronously. They give their response by pressing a
left response key for simultaneous stimuli and a right response key for
asynchronous stimuli. Very short SOAs of 17 ms are not detected
consciously but yield automatic visuomotor responses representing the
processing of events over time. Both patients and controls are biased to
respond as a function of the stimulus order, which shows that all subjects
distinguish events in time at an implicit level. However, there is a qualitative
difference in their bias with the shortest SOAs. Controls are biased to the
side of the second stimulus, as if able to follow stimuli in time, whereas
patients are biased to the side of the first stimulus, as if stuck with this
stimulus and unable to follow stimuli with time. With larger SOAs biases
are to the side of the second stimulus in all subjects.
level, i.e., even when they do not consciously detect an asynchrony
(Giersch et al., in press). At this non-conscious level, patients also
distinguished stimuli in time. However, for asynchronies eliciting
“simultaneous” judgments, patients’ responses were biased to the
side of the first square instead of the second one.
The authors interpreted these results as evidence of the
fact that at an implicit level patients process stimuli as if
they are isolated rather than in succession. They propose that
this impairment may be related to disturbed predictive coding.
Indeed, stimuli which are less than 20 ms apart mean that subjects
process a first stimulus while being prepared for another stimulus
which may follow. When the second stimulus is presented only
20 ms after the first one, attention cannot be shifted immediately
from the first to the second. If after a while the second stimulus
is nonetheless processed and prioritized, it means the system
is prepared to process a second stimulus and to shift attention
toward it. This might be based on a processing loop which
allows new events to be anticipated while the focus is still on
current information. This loop could be supplied by the recurrent
system of information processing described within the predic-
tive coding framework (Friston, 2008), which is in accordance
with an embodied approach of predictive interoceptive coding
(Seth, 2013). This hypothesis relates the timing results with those
observed with motor control, insofar as both outcomes suggest
impairments in the predictive loops that allow us to anticipate
events, either the consequence of the action or the next perceptual
event. The impairment patients have regarding time may reflect a
fragmentation of the processing of information that would impact
on the sense of time continuity. In particular, it could be linked to
the feeling of “frozen time” described above. Indeed, if patients
have difficulty following events in time at an implicit level, it
would disrupt their ability to process events in a continuous way,
matching what some patients explicitly reported. Moreover, it has
recently been shown that patients have difficulty discriminating
temporal order at a subjective level (Capa et al., 2014), which
reinforces the idea that they have difficulty processing the flow of
events. Below, we discuss how such impairments could be related
to minimal SDs.
TIME PROCESSING AND THE MINIMAL SELF
If the studies described above doubtlessly suggest impairments
at both explicit and implicit levels of time processing (Table 1),
their impact on minimal SDs is far from straightforward. Despite
the limitations of the phenomenological approach, it provides the
concepts that allow us to propose a link between the subjective
Table 1 | Summary of the results on implicit and explicit timing in schizophrenia.
Tasks Main works Main results in schizophrenia
Explicit timing
Simultaneity judgment Schwartz et al. (1984); Foucher et al. (2007);
Giersch et al. (2009); Lalanne et al. (2012b);
Martin et al. (2013)
Patients need larger inter-stimulus intervals
than controls to detect asynchrony
Temporal order judgment Capa et al. (2014) Altered temporal order judgment (even for
asynchronies producing a clear perception of
asynchrony)
Duration judgment Wahl and Sieg (1980); Tysk (1983); Tracy et al.
(1998); Volz et al. (2001); Elvevåg et al. (2003);
Carroll et al. (2008); Lee et al. (2009); Waters
and Jablensky (2009)
Great variability in performance
Implicit timing
Simon effect Lalanne et al. (2012a,b) Inability to follow stimuli over short delays
Temporal constraints on multisensory processing Martin et al. (2013) Lack of audio–visual integration despite
difficulties to detect asynchronies at
SOAs > 0 ms
Motor sequence learning and automation of rules Posada and Franck (2002); Exner et al. (2006) No benefit from predictability
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experience and the minimal self. What the experimental approach
provides on top of that is the possibility to objectify the mech-
anisms subtending the distortion of the world experience. As
emphasized at the beginning of this manuscript, and as suggested
in some phenomenological approaches, we consider that the basic
experience of oneself is intimately associated with the embodied
experience of the world, whether during action or perception. It
is because we can establish a close link between our intentions
and our actions or between what we expect to feel and what really
happens that we can implicitly feel we are the one perceiving
or acting. Thus, any disruption of our ability to predict or feel
the continuity in the flow of our perceptions and actions should
result in a disruption of the minimal self. This can apply even
in the case of passive movements. There is usually continuity in
our perception of our own body, which is confirmed from one
moment to the next. If such continuity is disrupted, however, it
should affect our implicit feeling of being one.
As emphasized above, the minimal self is a constituent part of
the feeling of being present here and now. This implies that both
(i) sensory information processing, and (ii) the way information
is processed in time play a role in the formation of the minimal
self. As already noted, this information does not have to be
unconscious to play a role in the minimal self. It only has to
exclude an explicit reflection on the self. Diverse information may
thus be integrated in the minimal self, including peripheral as
well as central sensory information, which conveys information
about our body, but also about the environment and how the
body behaves in the environment. This shapes our experience and
thus yields a sense of self in the environment, prior to language.
Besides, being myself “now” also implies having a sense of present
time, and since oneself is felt to be continuous in time, it addi-
tionally requires a sense of temporal continuity. In other words
the minimal self involves many different mechanisms, including
timing mechanisms. This means timing impairments should lead
to minimal SDs.
We will thus first detail which timing mechanisms are involved
in minimal self, and then how deficits in patients with schizophre-
nia may induce minimal SDs. Let us first consider the sense
of present and its possible relation with temporal windows of
information processing. The fact that all sensory information is
processed continuously from moment to moment necessitates a
temporal integration process that binds multimodal information,
into one single representation at one present moment1 (Pöppel,
1997; van Wassenhove, 2009; Wittmann, 2011). This is the dual
nature of time consciousness: the flow of events over time and
the feeling of “nowness.” These dual aspects are based on the
processing of sequences of events over time and the temporal
integration of these successive events through multiple and nested
functional brain states of various temporal levels (Northoff, 2013;
Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2014). Regarding the relationship
between temporal integration windows and the self, however,
what is especially crucial is to stabilize this representation for a
1Although the concept of representation is not at the center of the phe-
nomenological approach, the idea of information integration leads to the
notion of representation. In this sense, minimal self would be similar to the
concept of core consciousness as defined by Damasio (1998).
short duration. Otherwise, our perception would be one of an
uninterrupted flow of inputs conveyed by different sensory chan-
nels. This would lead to a number of difficulties, and especially
a difficulty to integrate these different inputs. When considering
only one sensory modality, it has been repeatedly suggested and
confirmed that there must be a minimal delay of 20–40 ms
between two stimuli for this asynchrony to be detected (von
Baer, 1864; Brecher, 1932; Elliott et al., 2006, 2007; Fink et al.,
2006; Babkoff and Fostick, 2013). The integration of complex
information from different channels within one single represen-
tation requires even more time (van Wassenhove et al., 2007).
It is, however, not as straightforward as it seems. For example,
visual and auditory information travels at different speed, and
it must be recalibrated to allow for its integration within a
single representation (Pöppel et al., 1990). It is only because the
motion of the lips and the syllable utterance are integrated within
the same time window and processed as co-temporal that we
access the representation of another person speaking instead of
disconnected visual and auditory information (van Wassenhove
et al., 2007). In a similar way, we integrate sensory information
from our body and of the environment in single representations
which are stabilized from moment to moment. A disruption of
these temporal windows may thus fragilize the minimal self. The
lengthening of time windows (Giersch et al., 2009) may represent
a mechanism of self-disruption in patients with schizophrenia.
Additionally, and as emphasized above, the representation of
ourselves is not only stabilized within temporal windows. The
self is generally experienced as being continuous in time. This
requires that sensory information be processed and integrated in
such a way that we experience continuity over time (Dainton,
2010; Wittmann, 2011; Northoff, 2013). Fragmentation of the
mental life would mean a disruption of the continuous processing
of the sensory information underlying the minimal self. The
implicit processing of information over time might be particularly
important for our feeling that we go along with the flow of events
in a continuous fashion. Conversely, disruption of these implicit
mechanisms in patients may disrupt their feeling of temporal
continuity. The fact that this impairment occurs implicitly may
also explain why they find it difficult to report this impairment
clearly. In summary, a number of time processing impairments
might contribute to minimal SDs. First, deficient integration of
information within temporal windows may hamper information
being stabilized. Second, an inability to process sensory informa-
tion continuously would lead to fragmentation of the information
subtending the minimal self.
Time disorders observed in schizophrenia might thus be
closely related to minimal SDs, and might subtend a series of
cognitive impairments. The existence of these relationships needs
to be confirmed in future studies. Although it is difficult to
test minimal SDs directly, it is possible to explore the impact
of the impairments described on conscious experience. Such
studies involving patients with schizophrenia should provide
insight into how time disorders affect our ability to feel ourselves
implicitly to be at the center of our perceptions and actions.
Thus, the question of whether the alterations observed in the
simultaneity/asynchrony judgments are related to the contents of
consciousness warrants investigation.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT RESEARCH ON TIME AND
MINIMAL SELF IN SCHIZOPHRENIA: METHODOLOGICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
NECESSITY OF RELATING PSYCHOPATHOLOGY WITH EXPERIMENTAL
APPROACHES
Although there is a growing interest in minimal SDs in
schizophrenia, there is an apparent neglect as regards experimen-
tal approaches regarding psychopathological hypotheses.
Whereas cognitive research into minimal SDs in schizophrenia
rarely includes the issue of time, in the case of cognitive research
into time processing in schizophrenia the question of minimal
SDs is rarely included. This is all the more paradoxical given that
these areas were originally united (Minkowski, 1933/2005), and
that psychopathological analysis has gathered data and developed
concepts about both for a long time. More recently, however,
these two lines of research have developed separately. According to
Nelson et al. (2013): “Although progress has been made in under-
standing phenomenological and neurocognitive disturbances in
schizophrenia, these “levels” or domains of enquiry have tended
to remain separate from each other”. Combining psychopatholog-
ical phenomena with experimental approaches seems a promising
way to proceed, at least on a heuristic level.
ASSESSING THE MINIMAL SELF: INCLUDING SUBTLE AND
DEMANDING CLINICAL EXPLORATIONS IN RESEARCH PROGRAMS
Assessing minimal SDs requires indisputable clinical expertise,
with the help, for example, of EASE, a phenomenologically ori-
ented instrument (Parnas et al., 2005). Regarding EASE, “the
interviewer must possess good prior interviewing skills, detailed
knowledge of psychopathology in general and of the schizophre-
nia spectrum conditions in particular.” So “a familiarity with
phenomenological description of the structures of human con-
sciousness is indispensable in using the EASE for pragmatic,
psychometric purposes” (Parnas et al., 2005).
Consequently, whether using EASE or some other scale, assess-
ing minimal SDs requires that investigators involved in experi-
mental research incorporate subtle clinical analyses within their
research programs.
“TIME OF PERCEPTION” IS NOT “PERCEPTION OF TIME”: ASPECTS OF
EMBODIMENT
As claimed in phenomenology, human time is not necessarily a
content of consciousness. Accordingly, as stated by Pöppel (2009),
“it is important to realize that we cannot perceive time itself.”
We believe that paradigms based on implicit time processing as
proposed by Giersch (with the Simon effect) or Coull (using auto-
matic temporal accumulation) are promising tasks for exploring
correlations between implicit time processing and minimal SDs.
However, this does not preclude investigating explicit time, i.e.,
the judgment of duration, especially since it has been shown that
the bodily self is related to time perception in the seconds’ range
(Wittmann, 2013). These empirical findings confirm embodied
notions of subjective time (Craig, 2009) and link the experiences
of emotion, time, and interoception for the creation of a self
(Seth, 2013). Inasmuch as the minimal self is related to conscious
and embodied experiences, such investigations are necessary
for understanding how implicit (and explicit) time processing
could affect impairments observed on a more subjective
level.
CONCLUSION
According to research in psychopathology, temporal processing
and minimal SDs appear as core components of the schizophrenia
condition. In general, the notions of time and the minimal self are
two fundamental components of human consciousness. “Time
and the self, time and consciousness, affects and time are pairs of
subjective reality, phenomena that appear together in the course
of man’s ontogenetic development and define human nature
[. . .]. Even though conceptualized independently, they cannot
be experienced separately, they cannot exist without each other”
(Hartocollis, 1983, p. 56). Combining the two dimensions of min-
imal self and time in experimental studies requires subtle clinical
analysis as well as the exploration of implicit time processes,
which, by definition, are not reflective. What we have shown,
however, is that they can disrupt a patient’s experience of the
world at fundamental levels, thus contributing to the minimal
SDs. In particular, we presented evidence of our own experimen-
tal studies relating to an implicit timing disturbance in patients
with schizophrenia which strikingly mirrors patients’ reports
of subjective time. We have potentially found an experimental
task which directly assesses the implicit timing disturbances of
patients with schizophrenia who, on an explicit level, become
aware of theses impairments. The underlying mechanisms might
also come into play in our ability to feel in control. Experimental
approaches can yield further information about the consequences
of these basic impairments for how subjects experience their
perceptions and actions. We are aware that this is not enough
to fill the gap that still exists between the phenomenological
approach and experimental investigations exploring elementary
aspects of timing, but we argue there is enough ground to at least
try to relate minimal self and timing disorders. Furthermore, we
propose that exploring the relationships between implicit timing
and the temporal structure of consciousness may help further
close the gap between the experimental and phenomenological
approaches.
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